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Improper Use of the Trial Judge as Voucher
The Issue
United States v. Harlow, 444 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2006), analyzes whether a
prosecutor acts improperly when he uses the trial judge to vouch for the credibility
of prosecution witnesses. The court finds that the prosecutor’s invitation to the
jury to rely on the actions of the judge amounted to improper vouching, although
the impropriety was not serious enough to warrant overturning the defendant’s
conviction.
The Facts
Harlow was the last of several defendants to be tried for participation in a
methamphetamine distribution conspiracy in Gillette, Wyoming. The government
relied upon six witnesses to prove its case, five of whom were coconspirators who
had entered guilty pleas and reached agreements with the government. Three
witnesses had already received sentence reductions for their testimony in prior
cases. With respect to these three, the prosecutor introduced their plea
agreements, which referred to the requirements of cooperation and truthfulness,
the government’s Rule 35 (b) motions recommending sentence reductions based
on their prior testimony, and the orders granting the reductions which were signed
by the same trial judge presiding over Harlow’s trial. With respect to the other
two witnesses who had not yet received sentence reductions, the prosecutor
questioned them about the contents of their plea agreements and the possibility of
their obtaining sentence reductions.
The Defense Attack
From the opening statements to the closing arguments, the defense attack on
the government was consistent. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor was
relying on “snitch testimony, testimony that is essentially . . . purchased by the
government in the form of time . . . less prison time.” Defense counsel
characterized the witnesses’ testimony as “unreliable” and suggested that each
witness “knows the score,” meaning that he “knows what he needs to do here in
Wyoming to help himself out.” Id. at 1259. Each witness, defense counsel
argued, knows “he only has to put a slight twist on his testimony to get the benefit
here.”
This is not the place to evaluate the quality of the defense argument, but it
ought to be pointed out that when five witnesses who have pleaded guilty to the
criminal conduct also charged against Harlow all testify to Harlow’s involvement,
it doesn’t look like “a slight twist.” If their testimony is all false, it looks like a
major, concerted effort to frame Harlow; there would be nothing slight about it.
The Prosecutor’s Response

Whether or not the jury found the argument to be odd is unknowable, but we do
know that the prosecutor chose to respond to the defense attack in the rebuttal
closing argument:
You know, the government always - it just doesn't matter. Any case
where you call coconspirators to testify against the other
coconspirators, we've suddenly hopped in bed with the defendants,
the coconspirators, and we've hopped in bed with drug dealers. It's
the law, ladies and gentlemen. Congress has a part in that process. [It
passes] laws that allow the government to give breaks to cooperating
coconspirator drug dealers. Separation of powers. It's all here.
Congress allows it to happen. The executive branch, representing the
executive, we're involved. We use them as witnesses. But what's
really important, and you can have a chance to take a look at this,
you've got the orders reducing their sentences signed by the
judicial branch, Judge Johnson. (Id. (emphasis added).)
The trial judge, Judge Alan B. Johnson, instructed the jury that it must examine the
testimony of an alleged accomplice or coconspirator “with greater care than the
testimony of a witness who did not participate in the commission of a crime,” and
it must “determine whether the testimony of an accomplice or coconspirator has
been affected by self-interest or by any agreement he may have with the United
States.” Id. at 1259-60.
Defense Counsel’s Complaint
Immediately after the court instructed the jury, defense counsel approached
the bench and requested either a mistrial or a curative instruction. He argued that
the government’s rebuttal argument “suggested that because [the trial court’s]
signature was on these [sentence reduction orders] that somehow the [trial judge]
was vouching for the credibility of these witnesses.” Id. at 1260.
The Trial Judge’s Curative Instruction
The trial judge denied the request for a mistrial but agreed to give a curative
instruction. He instructed the jury as follows:
There was reference made to me having signed an order approving a
plea agreement by and between the parties. I'd explain to you that I
review plea agreements and decide whether or not they violate any
public policy as part of the duties that the judge has in every case. I
don't vouch for the credibility of any of the witnesses who have
appeared here before this court. That is your job. That is not my job.
And I don't make that decision in a case. You're the ones who see the
witnesses testify, consider their testimony and, under the instructions
of the Court, are the judges of the facts and the weight and credibility

of the witnesses. (Id.)
The Trial Result
The jury deliberated for only three hours before it returned a guilty verdict.
The trial judge later sentenced Harlow to 120 months imprisonment, and Harlow
filed a notice of appeal through new counsel. One of his principal arguments was
that the prosecutor had improperly used the reference to the trial judge to vouch
for witnesses.
The Argument on Appeal
Harlow’s argument on appeal was “that vouching occurred when the jury
was given the provisions of the plea agreement in conjunction with the evidence
that the prosecutor moved for benefits thereunder and the judge issued his
approval.” Id. at 1262. According to Harlow, “the jury could very reasonably
infer that not only had these witnesses promised to tell the truth, but the prosecutor
and the judge had verified their testimony via the motion and order – testimony
consistent with their testimony at this trial.” Id. So, Harlow had two separate
arguments. The first, that the jury might have inferred that the prosecutor had
verified the testimony, is not discussed here. It is the subject of the next article.
The focus here is on the prosecutor’s reference to Judge Johnson.
The court of appeals agreed with Harlow that the prosecutor made an
improper argument:
Aside from his inelegant discussion of our tripartite system of
government, the prosecutor stated Judge Johnson had signed off on
the testimony of Janway, Flint and Villa. In our view, this violates the
prohibition against vouching. While the prosecutor probably meant
the jurors should look at the sentence reduction orders as evidence
that the judicial branch approves of sentence reductions and coconspirator testimony in general, his statements to the jury were not
so precise. Rather, he directed the jury to look at the sentence
reduction orders and attach special importance to them. This is too
easily construed as a statement that "the judicial branch, Judge
Johnson" had personally approved the credibility of the witnesses'
testimony by signing off on their sentence reduction orders. (Id. at
1266.)
The court stated that the government tried to defend the rebuttal argument
by contending that defense counsel impermissibly attacked the prosecutor’s
character and veracity, but the court found that this argument did not fit the facts
because defense counsel attacked the prosecution’s witnesses rather than the
prosecutor. Apparently, the court might have been sympathetic to the rebuttal
argument if defense counsel had suggested that the prosecutor had somehow acted

to create false testimony. The probable reasoning is that, when a prosecutor is
attacked for offering sentence reductions, the fact of judicial approval may be a
fair response to the attack.
The court went beyond simply finding improper vouching. It reiterated an
admonition to prosecutors that it had previously offered in United States v.
Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2000):
In Broomfield, we took the "opportunity to advise prosecutors against
what we perceive to be an increasing willingness to unnecessarily
push the envelope of improper vouching." 201 F.3d at 1276. We
repeat that admonition here. (Id.)
The court found that the vouching was not sufficiently prejudicial to require a new
trial, since the curative instruction given by the trial judge shortly after the
improper argument “sufficiently disabused the jury of any misimpression created
by the prosecutor’s inartful closing argument.” (Id.)
The Lesson
Prosecutors have to walk a fine line in dealing with sentence reduction
agreements. They offer them on direct examination to bring out the bargain that a
witness has received for cooperating with the government, but the fact that Rule
35 (b) sentence reduction agreements are approved by the court is no reason for
prosecutors to emphasize that fact. Prosecutors will be well advised to simply
point out the extent of the benefit that the witness has received.
Surprisingly prosecutors might also want to ask for the “curative”
instruction given by Judge Johnson in this case in all cases. The reason is that in a
future case a defendant might argue that jurors, unschooled in the mechanics of
Rule 35, might assume that it involves some judicial screening of the truthfulness
of prior testimony. This might be especially troubling when the trial judge in one
case approved the sentence reductions of the testifying witnesses, as was true in
Harlow. By asking for an instruction explaining that the judge does not vouch for
credibility when approving a sentence reduction, a prosecutor can avoid any claim
that the sentence reduction agreements might have been misunderstood by jurors
as judicial vouching.

